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HAS THE OBAMA JUSTICE DEPARTMENT 
REINVIGORATED ANTITRUST 
ENFORCEMENT? 
Daniel A. Crane* 
The Justice Department’s recently filed antitrust case against Apple and 
several major book publishers over e-book pricing, which comes on the heels 
of the Justice Department’s successful challenge to the proposed merger of 
AT&T and T-Mobile, has contributed to the perception that the Obama Admin-
istration is reinvigorating antitrust enforcement from its recent stupor. As a 
candidate for President, then-Senator Obama criticized the Bush Administra-
tion as having the “weakest record of antitrust enforcement of any administra-
tion in the last half century” and vowed to step up enforcement.
1
 Early in the 
Obama Administration, Justice Department officials furthered this perception 
by withdrawing the Bush Administration’s report on monopolization offenses 
and suggesting that the fault for the financial crisis might lie at the feet of lax 
antitrust enforcement.
2
 Even before the AT&T and Apple cases, media reports 
frequently suggested that antitrust enforcement is significantly tougher under 
President Obama. 
For better or worse, the Administration’s enforcement record does not bear 
out this impression. With only a few exceptions, current enforcement looks 
much like enforcement under the Bush Administration. Antitrust enforcement 
 
 * Daniel A. Crane is a Professor of Law at the University of Michigan Law School. 
 1.  Senator Barack Obama, Statement for the American Antitrust Institute (Sept. 27, 
2007), available at http://www.antitrustinstitute.org/files/aai-
%20Presidential%20campaign%20-%20Obama%209-07_092720071759.pdf. 
 2.  Christine A. Varney, Assistant Att’y Gen., Antitrust Div., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 
Vigorous Antitrust Enforcement in This Challenging Era 4-8 (May 11, 2009), available at 
http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/speeches/245711.pdf; see also Christopher Leonard, 
Farmers Tell Feds Considering Antitrust Action that Big Poultry Companies Control Indus-
try, STAR TRIB. (Minneapolis-St. Paul) (May 21, 2010), 
http://www.startribune.com/templates/Print_This_Story?sid=94618149 (reporting that At-
torney General Eric Holder announced that the Antitrust Division is now “open for busi-
ness”). 
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in the modern era is a technical and technocratic enterprise. Although there will 
be tweaks at the margin from administration to administration, the core of anti-
trust enforcement has been practiced in a relatively nonideological and nonpar-
tisan way over the last several decades.  
A cautionary note: one should be skeptical about judging the severity of 
antitrust enforcement by the number of cases brought alone.
3
 If the business 
community perceives an administration as a tough enforcer, it may propose 
fewer problematic mergers and engage in less anticompetitive behavior than if 
it perceives the administration to be weak. Antitrust enforcement vigor should 
not be assessed solely on statistics but also on qualitative measures. 
CRIMINAL ENFORCEMENT AGAINST CARTELS 
There has long been a consensus that fighting hard-core price-fixing cartels 
is the Justice Department’s most important task.
4
 Price-fixing cartels do serious 
damage to consumer welfare. They are often difficult to detect and can persist 
for years. Increasingly, enforcement attention has focused on international co-
operation to fight global cartels and on the use of leniency and amnesty tools to 
incentivize firms or individuals to defect from cartels and provide information 
helpful to cracking the cartel and convicting the responsible parties. 
Comparing anticartel enforcement during the last two full years of the 
Bush Administration with the first two full years of the Obama Administra-
tion,
5
 the numbers actually suggest greater enforcement vigor under Bush. On a 
 
 3.  It bears noting, however, that Senator Obama justified his criticisms of the Bush 
Administration’s antitrust enforcement record largely based on enforcement statistics. See 
Obama, supra note 1 (“Between 1996 and 2000, the FTC and DOJ together challenged on 
average more than 70 mergers per year on the grounds that they would harm consumer wel-
fare. In contrast, between 2001 and 2006, the FTC and DOJ on average only challenged 33. 
And in seven years, the Bush Justice Department has not brought a single monopolization 
case.”). 
 4.  See, e.g., Belinda A. Barnett, Senior Counsel, Antitrust Div., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 
Criminalization of Cartel Conduct—The Changing Landscape at 1 (April 3, 2009), available 
at http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/speeches/247824.pdf (“It is well known that the Anti-
trust Division has long ranked anti-cartel enforcement as its top priority.”); see also Verizon 
Commc’ns, Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S. 398, 408 (2004) (referring 
to collusion among competitors as “the supreme evil of antitrust”). 
 5.  The Justice Department reports its enforcement statistics based on the federal fis-
cal year (October to September). Fiscal Year 2009 thus includes five months of Bush Ad-
ministration activities and several months of early Obama Administration activities, before 
the new political appointees were in place. I have thus excluded statistical data on FY 2009 
and focused solely on full years for both administrations. I have compared just the last two 
full years of the Bush Administration to the first two full years of the Obama Administration 
because only two full years are available under Obama, and the last two full years under 
Bush provide the most temporally proximate comparison. Comparing the Obama Admin-
istration figures to a different period during either term of the Bush Administration would 
not produce materially different observations, with one exception: cartel fines increased 
dramatically between the first and second terms of the Bush Administration. 
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statistical basis, the most important figures are arguably the total fines collect-
ed, the number of individuals sentenced to incarceration, the total number of 
jail days sentenced, and the number of grand jury investigations initiated.
6
 In 
three of the four categories, enforcement levels were significantly higher under 
Bush. The Bush Administration collected a total of $1.31 billion in fines during 
its last two full years, whereas Obama collected $1.08 billion in fines during its 
first two full years. The Bush Administration also secured a greater number of 
incarceration days sentenced—45,722 days for 2007 to 2008, compared with 
36,590 for the Obama Administration in 2010 to 2011. The Bush Administra-
tion initiated considerably more grand jury investigations: 66 to 29. The Bush 
Administration numbers are slightly lower in individuals sentenced to incarcer-
ation—70 in 2007 to 2008, compared to 76 for the Obama Administration in 
2010 to 2011. 
As the Antitrust Division hastened to make clear in its most recent newslet-
ter, fiscal year 2012 is on pace to be a record year for criminal fines.
7
 It is likely 
that the Division’s overall record in cartel enforcement—judged statistically—
will be roughly the same as the prior Administration’s. 
Beyond the statistics, there is no basis for believing that firms are engaging 
in fewer price-fixing conspiracies because of a perception that the Obama Ad-
ministration is strong on anticartel enforcement. The essential enforcement pri-
orities (international cartels) and tools (leniency and amnesty) have not signifi-
cantly changed, except that the Obama Administration announced the closure 
of a number of Antitrust Division field offices that were heavily involved in an-
ticartel enforcement.
8
 Anticartel enforcement has become professional and 
largely independent from the governing administration’s political ideology. 
MERGER CHALLENGES 
A second major component of antitrust enforcement is the review of mer-
gers under the Hart-Scott-Rodino Act, which requires premerger notification of 
mergers and acquisitions meeting certain financial thresholds. Under any ad-
ministration, only a small fraction of mergers raise antitrust concerns. Also un-
der any administration, only a small fraction of the mergers that raise antitrust 
 
 6.  The total number of cartel cases filed is a poor proxy for enforcement vigor, since 
the number of “cases” attributed to a single price-fixing cartel can vary widely depending on 
how and when the defendants are charged. 
 7.  Through March 2, 2012, the Antitrust Division had collected $567 million in fines 
for FY 2012. U.S. DOJ Antitrust Division Update Spring 2012, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, 
http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/division-update/2012/criminal-program.html (last visited 
July 14, 2012).  
 8.  See Matthew Volkov, Career Antitrust Division Attorneys Boggled by Field Office 
Closures, MAIN JUSTICE (June 18, 2012, 2:19 PM), 
http://www.mainjustice.com/2012/06/18/career-antitrust-division-attorneys-boggled-by-
field-office-closures/. 
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concerns will be challenged under section 7 of the Clayton Act, the substantive 
statute governing merger activity.
9
 The majority of the cases that raise concern 
are addressed through structural or conduct commitments to government anti-
trust enforcers, or the parties walk away from the merger. Few cases are litigat-
ed. 
The merger statistics do not evidence “reinvigoration” of merger enforce-
ment under Obama. Focusing on the last two fiscal years under Bush and the 
first two fiscal years under Obama, the numbers are comparable. In those peri-
ods, the Bush Administration conducted more total merger investigations (Bush 
185, Obama 154) and more Hart-Scott-Rodino investigations (Bush 152, 
Obama 127). The two administrations had almost exactly the same number of 
“second requests” for information under Hart-Scott (an investigatory mecha-
nism that delays the closing of a merger and often forces the merging parties to 
either negotiate with the government or abandon the merger). From 2007 to 
2008, Bush made 52 second requests, and from 2010 to 2011, Obama made 53. 
The Obama Administration challenged slightly more mergers (Bush 16, Obama 
19), and challenges announced by the Obama Administration resulted in more 
transactions restructured or abandoned prior to filing a complaint (Bush 9, 
Obama 15), although the numbers are small under both metrics. 
These raw comparisons may not be sufficiently informative because of the 
reduced numbers of mergers due to the effects of the financial crisis. But even 
adjusted for the number of Hart-Scott filings, the numbers remain comparable, 
although with a tick up in second requests under Obama. The Bush Administra-
tion conducted 0.04 investigations per Hart-Scott filing; Obama conducted 0.05 
investigations per filing. The Bush Administration made 0.013 second requests 
for information per Hart-Scott filing; Obama’s made 0.020—a 50% increase on 
a per capita basis.  
What about qualitative measures? Although there was quite a bit of media 
hype about some of the Obama Justice Department’s merger challenges, they 
actually were not theoretically or factually adventurous. AT&T/T-Mobile, the 
Administration’s top headline grabber, was a conventional challenge to a “four 
to three” merger (a merger between two firms in a market with four firms) be-
tween the second- and fourth-largest firms in a concentrated industry with high 
barriers to entry.
10
 Similarly, the Administration’s enforcement against the pro-
 
 9.  15 U.S.C. § 18 (2006). 
 10.  The Bush Administration also challenged a number of 4-3, or even less concen-
trated, mergers. See, e.g., United States v. Commscope, Inc., Case No. 1:07-cv-02200 
(D.D.C.) (Dec. 6, 2007) (alleging that, premerger, there were only four companies providing 
drop cable services); United States v. Cemex S.A.B. de CV, 1:07-CV-00640 (D.D.C.) (April 
4, 2007) (alleging anticompetitive effects from both 3-2 and 4-3 consolidations in different 
geographic markets); United States v. First Data Corp., 1:03CV02169 (D.D.C.) (Oct. 23, 
2003) (alleging that, premerger, the four largest firms in market had over 90% share); see 
also United States v. Cenage Learning Holdings I, L.P., Case No. Case No. 1:07-cv-02200 
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posed H&R Block/TaxAct, NASDAQ/NYSE, and Blue Cross/Blue 
Shield/Physicians Health mergers were conventional horizontal merger chal-
lenges that could have gone the same way under any administration. 
The more adventurous theories of harm were on display in the cases the 
Administration did not block—particularly the TicketMaster/LiveNation and 
Comcast/NBC vertical mergers. Although the Administration required signifi-
cant procompetitive structural and/or conduct commitments in both cases, it al-
lowed the mergers to proceed. 
A merger-related activity that could signal a change in enforcement level is 
the 2010 revision of the Horizontal Merger Guidelines, a joint project of the 
Federal Trade Commission (FTC) and the Justice Department. The Obama 
Guidelines revised the market concentration thresholds under the Herfindahl-
Hirschman Index (HHI) upwards from the previous Guidelines, which had been 
in place since the Reagan Administration.
11
 This suggests that greater levels of 
concentration resulting from a horizontal merger will be necessary to trigger 
antitrust scrutiny than under the previous regime. 
On the other hand, the new Guidelines approach could subtly signal a 
tougher approach to mergers in a different way. One of the changes in the 2010 
Guidelines is a demotion of traditional structural measures—such as market 
definition and market concentration—in favor of more “direct” evidence of 
competitive impacts. One of the tools proposed for evaluating the potential an-
ticompetitive effects of mergers is an “upward pricing pressure” model, which 
looks at the premerger profit margins of the merging firms and the diversion 
ratio of customer demand. Because profit margins are often high in differentiat-
ed goods markets, this upward pricing pressure model could be used to predict 
that many more mergers than previously expected will result in the unilateral 
exercise of market power. However, any such effects from the Guidelines revi-
sions have not yet shown up. 
Another subtle change that could point towards a shift in merger control 
policy comes from the Obama Administration’s revision to the Policy Guide to 
Merger Remedies, released in June 2011.
12
 The revised guide is more receptive 
to the possibility of behavioral remedies than its 2004 predecessor. A behavior-
al remedy allows a merger to proceed, but only subject to conduct commit-
 
 
(D.D.C) (May 28, 2008) (alleging that merging firms collectively amounted to 35% of sales 
in relevant market and were among a “few” firms with a significant presence in the market). 
 11.  The HHI measures market concentration as the sum of the square of the market 
shares of the individual market participants. Since 1982, the Merger Guidelines have provid-
ed an indication of how concerned the agencies are likely to be about horizontal mergers 
based on identification of markets as unconcentrated, mildly concentrated, or highly concen-
trated based on the HHI. The 2010 Merger Guidelines increased the HHI number required 
for a market to be considered moderately or highly concentrated. 
 12.  U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, ANTITRUST DIVISION POLICY GUIDE TO MERGER REMEDIES 
(2011), available at http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/guidelines/272350.pdf. 
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ments by the merging parties, such as those employed in TicketMas-
ter/LiveNation and Comcast/NBC.
13
 One could characterize a shift toward be-
havioral remedies as “weaker” on merger enforcement, since it allows poten-
tially anticompetitive mergers to close in order to secure their efficiency 
advantages. Many who favor more aggressive antitrust enforcement are con-
cerned about any shift away from structural remedies.
14
  
In sum, merger control looks statistically comparable in the Bush and 
Obama administrations. Only subtle changes in the Merger Guidelines could 
point toward tougher merger review, but they could be potentially offset by 
other policy changes in the Justice Department’s remedy guidelines. 
MONOPOLIZATION AND NONCARTEL RESTRAINTS OF TRADE 
The final major enforcement category is civil nonmerger cases. This gener-
ally includes challenges to monopolizing conduct under section 2 of the Sher-
man Act and to agreements restraining competition under section 1 of the 
Sherman Act. 
Using the same timing criteria (2007 to 2008 for Bush and 2010 to 2011 
for Obama), the numbers do not suggest much of a “reinvigoration” under 
Obama. The Bush Administration conducted 38 nonmerger civil investigations; 
the Obama Administration conducted 43. The Bush Administration filed 3 civil 
restraint of trade cases, the Obama Administration filed 7. 
The only headline case in this batch is the challenge to Visa, MasterCard, 
and American Express’s practice of restricting merchants from giving discounts 
to customers who use lower-fee cards. While important, this case is round two 
in the Justice Department’s litigation against the credit card companies. Round 
one—a challenge to Visa and MasterCard’s restrictions on the issuance of 
competitors’ cards by their member banks—was initiated late in the Clinton 
Administration and successfully tried and defended on appeal by the Bush Ad-
ministration. The Apple e-books case presents some potentially interesting is-
sues, but the Justice Department’s legal theory is conventional—that the pub-
 
 13.  For example, TicketMaster was required to license its ticketing software to two 
competitors sell its Paciola ticketing company and prohibited the merged firm from punish-
ing concert venues that did not use its ticketing or promotional services. As a condition of 
their merger, Comcast and NBC were required to make available to online video distributors 
(OVDs) the same package of broadcast and cable channels that they sell to traditional video 
programming distributors and to offer an OVD broadcast, cable and film content that is simi-
lar to, or better than, the content the distributor receives from any of Comcast or NBC’s pro-
gramming peers. 
 14.  See American Antitrust Institute, John E. Kwoka & Diana L. Moss, Behavioral 
Merger Remedies: Evaluation and Implications for Antitrust Enforcement, 
http://www.antitrustinstitute.org/~antitrust/sites/default/files/AAI_wp_behavioral%20remedi
es_final.pdf. 
  
July 2012] ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT UNDER OBAMA 19 
 
lishers agreed to fix e-book prices in violation of the longstanding per se rule 
against price fixing.  
The final category is monopolization cases. Over the eight years of the 
Bush Administration, the Justice Department filed no monopolization cases. To 
date, the Obama Administration has filed only one case, hardly evidencing a 
major shift in tactics. The case, against United Regional Health Care System of 
Wichita, Texas, was hardly a blockbuster antimonopoly action of the earlier 
Standard Oil, IBM, AT&T, or Microsoft variety. The Justice Department al-
leged that the relevant market was for the sale of inpatient hospital services to 
insurance companies in a geographic area “no larger than the Wichita Falls 
Metropolitan Statistical Area.”
15
 One wonders why this needed to be a federal 
case at all. In any event, the monopolization theory—that United had a 90% 
market share in acute inpatient services and used exclusive dealing contracts 
with insurance companies to stifle competitors—would fit comfortably within 
the Bush Administration’s monopolization report that the Obama Administra-
tion jettisoned.
16
 
CONCLUSION 
The analysis presented in this Essay has been limited to antitrust enforce-
ment by the Justice Department’s Antitrust Division. This Essay has not con-
sidered enforcement by the FTC, which also enforces the antitrust laws. The 
FTC is an independent commission and hence acts relatively independently of 
the President. Recent work examining the FTC by Bill Kovacic, an FTC Com-
missioner during the Bush Administration, has shown a similar story to the one 
presented here for the Antitrust Division. At least as a statistical matter, FTC 
enforcement actions have not increased during the Obama Administration.
17
 
Two points stressed earlier should be stressed again: (1) statistical 
measures of antitrust enforcement are an incomplete way of understanding the 
overall level of enforcement; and (2) to say that the Obama Administration’s 
record of enforcement is not materially different than the Bush Administra-
tion’s is not to chide Obama for weak enforcement. Rather, it is to debunk the 
claims that antitrust enforcement is strongly dependent on politics. 
 
 15.  Complaint at 7, United States v. United Reg’l Health Care Sys., No. 7:11-cv-
00030 (N.D. Tex. Feb. 25, 2011), available at 
http://www.justice.gov/atr/cases/f267600/267651.pdf. 
 16.  See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, COMPETITION AND MONOPOLY: SINGLE-FIRM CONDUCT 
UNDER SECTION 2 OF THE SHERMAN ACT 140-41 (2008), available at 
http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/reports/236681.pdf (setting forth principles for determining 
when exclusive dealing is anticompetitive). 
 17.  See William E. Kovacic, Improving the Institutions of U.S. Federal Antitrust En-
forcement, MLEX MAGAZINE, Apr.-June 2012, at 42, 44-45, available at 
http://info.mlex.com/media/5786/42%20abex%20kovacic%20us.pdf. 
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This examination of the “reinvigoration” claim should not be understood as 
acceptance that tougher antitrust enforcement is always better. Certainly, there 
have been occasions when an administration would be wise to ease off the gas 
pedal. At present, however, there is a high degree of continuity from one ad-
ministration to the next.  
